

**SUSTAINABILITY OF THE NONVIOLENCE
MOVEMENT IN JORDAN**

By

Dr. Amer Bani Amer

Nabeel Ali, Mai E'leimat, Ayoub Namour

Working paper

**Reclaiming the Power of Nonviolence: Successes,
Obstacles, and Sustainability of Nonviolence
Movements in the Arab Spring**

March 29 and 30, 2012

**American University, School of International
Service**

TABLE OF CONTENT

Executive Summary	3
Brief on the political system in Jordan	4
Introduction of the nonviolent movements in Jordan	5
The relevance of the nonviolent movements in Jordan to the Arab Spring	6
The main nonviolent movements in Jordan during the Arab Spring	6
The demands of the nonviolent movements in Jordan	9
The evolution of the movements in Jordan	11
Government's response to the nonviolent movements in Jordan	13
Reasons behind the nonviolent nature of the movements in Jordan	15
Nonviolence strategies used by the movements in Jordan	16
Challenges faced by the nonviolent movements in Jordan	
Internal challenges (weaknesses)	17
External challenges (threats)	
The demographic challenge to the nonviolent movements in Jordan	
The role of women, media civil society and minorities in the nonviolent movements in Jordan	20
The impact of the movements on democratization and good governance	22
The future of the nonviolent movements and the political system in Jordan	23
Summary, Recommendations and Lessons Learnt	24

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

It can be assumed that the nonviolent movements in Jordan had started long before the Arab Spring. Going back as far as 2009 and 2010, a politicized movement rose, symbolized by the “retired military personnel current”, as well as a unionized movement embodied by an interest group calling for more rights of the day-to-day persons contracted by the government (evolved into a politicized movement centered in Theiban – governorate of Madaba) and by another group demanding the establishment of a teachers’ syndicate (parts of the group evolved into a politicized movement centered in the governorate of Karak). The main reasons behind instigating such movements are the deteriorating economic situation in the country and increased levels of poverty; the political setbacks in the democratization process due to rigging the 2007 parliamentary and municipal elections and the 2010 parliamentary elections; the nontransparent privatization of state assets over the past decade or so; and the emerging calls for the preservation of the Jordanian national identity in light of increased insinuations of the notion of a “substitute homeland” in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

These movements, and others, progressed, by influence of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, to take on different shapes and names, mainly with geographic or tribal connotation. However, one movement, the March 24th, was fully inspired by the groups in Tunisia and Egypt. Though the March 24th movement did not last for long, it is considered a milestone in the Jordanian Spring, due to the violence it accompanied.

The nonviolent movements in Jordan are faced with several challenges; the use of force by security apparatus in some cases; government’s ability to softly contain some of the movements; the division within and between the movements and their inability to create a national framework to operate under; their inability to provide a specific and detailed list of demands, where their discourse remains in general terms; the division over the Syrian situation, especial among the opposition parties, which lead to compromising the Higher Coordination Committee for the Opposition Parties; and the vague relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the regime. Moreover, the government has been cunning and crafty in while recognizing the movements, as it would recognize

the demands at one point, and later on would slander the movements. However, the most important of the challenges is demographic. The Jordanian society is composed of almost a balanced ratio of Jordanians from east bank origins and west bank origins, and where the latter did not take part in the movements at large, these movements have lost momentum.

These challenges and more have caused the movements to remain disjointed with no agreement on demands and to currently continue their activities for the sake of sustaining themselves, rather than continuing for achieving demands. Nonetheless, the impact of the movements was visible in the amendments of the constitution; legislative reform in terms of electoral, political parties and public gathering laws; and the increased government scrutiny and investigation of suspected corruption cases.

The sustainability of the nonviolent nature of the movements depends on both the activists and the government. The movements have generally been nonviolent, except for some verbal violence in the slogans during the protests. Such verbal violence was met with the use of force in some cases by the security apparatus, or related groups of “loyalists”, especially if it touched on the King or the royal family. Thus it can be said the government’s response to the movements has also been largely nonviolent.

The movements have resulted to many tools, such as social media, statements and sit-ins, and strategies, such as avoiding friction with their objectors, refraining from violently reacting to abuse, dialogue with government and security officials and seeking legal action in courts, to maintain its nonviolent nature.

The participation of women and minorities in the movements was apparent, however, with lower influence than that of the tribes. The involvement of the tribes had allowed unexpected levels of slogans and demands.

As for the political parties, the Muslim Brotherhood, through the Islamic Action Front (IAF), has been the most active and polarized; though its demands and activities remained constant as such it was before the Arab Spring. Other parties have also been involved the movements, whether in coordination with the IAF or with tribes, the most active of which were the pan-nationalists such as the

Socialist Arab Bath Party, the Communist Party and the Popular Unity Party. Many activists in the nonviolent movement regard political parties to be inefficient and one step behind in addressing people's needs and demands and in taking the streets. Noting that the Jordanian government would only engage the IAF in political discussions, allowing grounds for both to be criticized by other political parties and tribal forces.

It is most likely that the government will not meet the demands of the Muslim Brotherhood or the other movements protesting nonviolently, which will drive the country to a crossroad of unknown endings. This is as the government's policy has been to eliminate the movements thus far, instead of utilizing it to create frameworks and effect social and political change. As per observation and remarks of many of those interviewed for this research, the divisions and disparities among the movements in Jordan have provided the regime the opportunity to check the level of reforms to be instituted. The constitutional amendments and suggested reformed political legislations are seen by many to surpass the demands of the movements.

Finally, we would conclude by acknowledging the role played by the electronic media in gathering support for the nonviolent movements in Jordan; noting that some sites were utilized by the government in the late days of the movements to slander and portray the activists as disloyal.

SUSTAINABILITY OF THE NONVIOLENT MOVEMENTS IN JORDAN

I. BRIEF ON THE POLITICAL SYSTEM IN JORDAN

The Jordanian state was established in early twentieth century as a result of Jordan's tribes' consensus. These tribes were representing independent governments in the south, center and north of Jordan. Affected by the development of neighboring states, specifically post to the Great Arab Revelation in 1916, Jordan's tribes agreed on a structure of a social contract with the Hashemite family whom has been ruling the country since 1921. Both sides; the tribes and the Hashemite family were satisfied with this contract, and since then, they have been working to build the institutions and the structure of the state.

The general trend for Jordanians was supporting the Hashemite ruling to Jordan. However; the early period of building the state has witnessed several challenges accompanied by some of the tribes' attempt to revolte against the Hashemite regime. King Abdullah I was called the founder of the Jordanian Kingdom who ruled during the period 1921-1951; establishing democratic legitimacy by promulgating Jordan's first constitution in 1928 and holding elections for its first parliament in 1929.

Following to his assassination in 1951 by a lone gunman while he was praying at Al-Aqsa Mosque in palestine, his son, King Talal, assumed the throne for less than one year due to his health circumstances; he abdicated the throne in 1952 in favor of his eldest son King Hussein. King Talal left unforgettable remark by developing of a new, liberalized constitution in 1952. King Hussain Bin Talal who ruled the country at the age of 17 (a regency Council was appointed to him until his formal accession to the throne by the age of 18 on May 2, 1953). During his ruling, Jordan's main industries -including phosphate, potash and cement- were developed, and a network of highways and infrastructure was built throughout the kingdom. On the relation level with his people King Hussain developed a strong relationship with the Jordanian community, it can be said that it has been the strongest relationship the Hashemites ever had with the Jordanians. After coming to power in 1999 King Abdullah II worked to maintain these loyal relationship to the Hashemite regime; fostering the country to more political and

economic openness. However, The ruling of King Abdullah II was accompanied with critical regional and global events, mainly represented by: the third gulf war in 2003, the tumble of the peace process between the Israelis and Palestinians, and the global financial crisis. The negative impacts of these events have led Jordanians to criticize the government's nontransparent privatization of state assets. Moreover, the public political depression after the rigged 2010 and 2007 parliamentary elections and 2007 municipality elections have hindered the policies of King Abdullah II and cause huge public dissatisfaction.

II. INTRODUCTION OF THE NONVIOLENT MOVEMENTS IN JORDAN

It can be assumed that the nonviolent movements in Jordan had started long before the Arab Spring. Going back as far as 2009 and 2010, a politicized movement rose, symbolized by the “retired military personnel current”, as well as a unionized movement embodied by an interest group calling for more rights of the day-to-day persons contracted by the government (evolved into a politicized movement centered in Theiban – governorate of Madaba) and by another group demanding the establishment of a teachers’ syndicate (parts of the group evolved into a politicized movement centered in the governorate of Karak). The main reasons behind instigating such movements can be summarized by: the political frustration and political setbacks in the democratization process caused by rigged parliamentary and municipal elections in 2007 and 2010, the general weakness in the performance of political parties, the increased exposure of corruption cases with lack of political will for combating it, the discussion on the elements of the Jordanian identity, and the notion of a “substitute homeland” for the Palestinians, in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the deteriorating economic situation caused by many factors, especially the privatization policy on state assets adopted by the governments over the past decade.

III. THE RELEVANCE OF THE NONVIOLENT MOVEMENTS IN JORDAN TO THE ARAB SPRING

A huge debate whether to consider the Jordan nonviolent movements as part of Arab spring or to consider it an independent movement took place among the activists and analysts, and even amongst the public in Jordan. However, this debate agrees on one opinion that these movements have progressed, by influence of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, to take on different shapes and names, mainly with geographic or tribal connotation. The opinion arguing that the Jordanian movements are part and influenced by the Arab spring refer to the following indicators: the evolution of the movements' demands, the tools and technologies used to express the demands and opinions, type of participants in the movements, locations of the movements' activities and demonstrations, government's attempts of reforms and compromising, the nonviolent nature of the movements, where even the cleanliness of sit-in locations have been preserved, no weapons of any sort were carried to any of the nonviolent movements' activities.

On the other hand, it is evident that the Jordanian movements have differed from the others during the Arab spring in terms of: firstly, the level of public participation; the public participation at the movements in Jordan maintain the same quantitative level which is one of the obstacles faced by these movements. Secondly, the government's response to the movements; the soft containment strategy used by the government has contributed to the nonviolent nature of the movements.

IV. THE MAIN NONVIOLENT MOVEMENTS IN JORDAN DURING THE ARAB SPRING

During the Arab spring, many movements have emerged on the Jordanian scene. Those movements varied in their demands; starting by demands related to providing services and progressing to demands related to political reform, fighting corruption, and enhancing the social justice. Some of these movements has rose one demand such as coming back to Jordanian Constitution legislated in 1952 by the movement of "1952 Constitution", while other called for many

demands such as the movement of “March 24th”. The following is a highlight on the most visible movements during the Arab spring:

1. The movement of March 24th: a nonviolence movement organized by a group of young Jordanian from different areas in Jordan. At the beginning; the movement wasn't counted to specific party or body. However, it was later accounted to the Islamic Action Front Party (IAF). The movement has organized an open protest on 24th March 2011 at Interior circle (Jamal Abd al Nassir Square) in Amman inspired by the Egyptian and Tunisian experiences. The movement demanded the regime to apply the principle of “nation is the source of all powers”, limiting the king's powers as the higher commander of the armed forces and the head of the three Authorities (executive, legislative, and judicial), an election law addresses the Jordanian population density with adapting a parliamentary government approach, elected upper house, establishment of the constitutional court, and the elimination of the inelegance's intervention in the public life. Though the March 24th movement did not last for long, it is considered a milestone in the Jordanian Spring, due to the violence it accompanied

2. The Jordanian Campaign for Change: Movement of "Jayeen": where Jayeen is an Arabic word means “we are coming”. The movement was launched in January 2011 at the end of a meeting for group of activists. The activists agreed to actively participate in the organization of demonstrations each Friday until their demands are accomplished. Moreover, they called for a quick formation of national salvation government; placing this demand on beginning of their list. In addition to, fighting corruption, changing the policy of searching for positions and advantages (indicating to the government's officials), and approving the establishment of a teachers' syndicate.

3. The Movement “April 15th”: the movement was launched by a group of young Jordanians; calling for marking of the 22nd anniversary of “Habbet Neesan” (the April uprising) in 1989. The movement announced its intentions to strongly encourage and organize an open protests starting from the date of 15th April in different areas (Badia, cities, villages, refugee camps, etc.). The movement coordinator Ahmad Qatawneh stated that this movement aims to revive the memory

of “Habbet Neesan”, which occurred in the year 1989 through new demands for revolution.

4. The Movement “Youth of 15th May”: the movement was launched to serve a Palestinian-Jordanian cause, in specific Palestinian right of return and rejection of the plan “substitute homeland”. The movement has announced through Facebook its continuous participation in the Arab movement for liberation of Palestine; inviting other people to join their demonstration entitled “Friday of return & mobilization” at the yard of University of Jordan on Friday 13th May 2012.

5. The Movement “The Constitution of 1952”: the movement aimed to launch a constitutional reform process to enhance the democratic practices in light of full participation by the citizens in the decision making process. According to this movement these demands could be achieved by restoring the constitution originally written in 1952; calling to restore the nondemocratic amendments made to the 1952 constitution during the last decades. They were pleading to develop the constitution to be in consistent with and to meet the aspirations of true democracy.

6. The Movement “Boycotting campaign for Change”: the movement was a result of the Jordanian Democratic Popular Unity Party (DPU) decision to boycott the upcoming parliamentary elections. Allying with Islamic Action Front Party (IAF), the political office of the DPU announces in September 2010 the structure of a campaign targeting young Jordanians in general and universities’ students in specific to advocate for their boycotting to the upcoming parliamentary elections. The campaign highlighted the impact of such boycotting on pressuring government to organize free, fair and transparent elections; referring to the negative election law currently performed.

7. The Movement “Jordanian Tribes’ Coalition for Reform and anti-corruption”: the coalition includes seven Jordanian tribes’ coalitions. Those are: coalition of Bani Sakher Tribe, coalition of Bani Hassan Tribe, coalition of D'ajaa Tribe, coalition of Ajarmah Tribe, and the National Movement for Reform representing the Northern Badia district Those are: coalition of Bani Sakher Tribe, coalition of Bani Hassan Tribe, coalition of D'ajaa Tribe, coalition of Ajarmah Tribe, and the National Movement for Reform representing the

Northern Badia district. The tribes' coalitions have mainly raise mottos calling for the reform of the regime, and the fight corruption.

8. The Movement "Ajloun Mountain Coalition for Reform": after many meetings and intensive discussions between different political spectrums and popular movements in Ajloun, the coalition was launched on December 2011. The coalition demanded to attain a constitutional reform, fighting corruption, and investigation on the privatization policy on state assets during the past years; referring to the importance of reserving Jordan's stability and maintaining a nonviolence demands.

V. THE DEMANDS OF THE NONVIOLENT MOVEMENTS IN JORDAN

A set of demands appeared on surface since the beginning of the movements in Jordan. These are:

Political reform: the most important demand in this regards was to change the mechanism of forming the governments and to enhance peoples' role in the decision making process. Moreover, a demand was put forward to elect the upper house, which shares the lower house in the legislative authority, instead of currently being appointing by the King. Other demands even gone beyond this call by calling to cancel existent of the upper house.

Furthermore, the demands focused on amending a new election law addressing the different spectrums in Jordan and passing a new parties law enabling more active participation and preventing the interference of the interior ministry and intelligence. Further, demands reached to calling for constitutional amendments to clarify the king's power. In some occasions the demands reached to calling for constitutional monarchy. It's worth mentioning that during the movements in Jordan there were a lot of articles, slogans, and statements with high ceiling touching the king and the royal family. However these were not representing the general trend, which was always focusing on the importance of attaining a series of political reform to keep the harmony and a nonviolence relationship between the regime and the people.

Public freedoms: this demand can be summarized by the calling to prevent the intelligence interference in the civic life, to enhance the public freedoms of expressions and to enhance the political and partisan participation inside and outside universities. The demand also fingered on the right for activism to appear before civic trial not as currently appearing before military trial and to activate the new constitutional amendment in regards to reducing the role of State Security Court and enhance the role and independency of civil judiciary.

Economic Reform: the economic demands played a significant and essential role in expanding the base of participation at the nonviolence movements; attracting participants from labor, medium and small bourgeois classes. The economic demands can be summarized by: fair distribution of development gains, the economic balance between the employees of public sector, enhance the living standards of citizens, eradicate poverty and unemployment in remote governorates, hold the privatization process for some of state assets and conduct investigation on the corruption accompanied with these process. In addition to, prosecuting the corrupted officials and recover these assets.

Educational Reform: this demand was raised due to the involvement of universities' students, teachers and professors, along with other factions of the Jordanian community in the movements. The demands can be summarized by: fair distribution of universities scholarships; based on academic qualification, reduce universities tuitions to fit in with the current economic situation, reduce unemployment rate by opening new jobs' opportunities inline with the number of graduates and their faculties. In addition to, opening the space for partisan and political activism inside universities and preventing the security intervention to students' freedoms. This demand has also includes a deep-rooted calling for establishing a national union for universities' students. On the other hand, establishing a teachers' syndicate was one of the major demand contributed to the evolution of movements in Jordan.

Demands related to Health Aspect: public health insurance is covering a wide faction of the Jordanian society. The low quality of the services provided was always complained about. However, modest demands in this regard have revealed on surface represented by labor strikes at the public health sector such

as doctors, allied health professions, technicians and nurses requesting mainly to increase their salaries and life standards.

Demands related to Social aspect: these demands can be summarized by: enhancing the social justice and fighting the corruption resulted out of social practices such as “Wasta” referring to connections.

VI. THE EVOLUTION OF THE MOVEMENTS IN JORDAN

Movements in Jordan began in Theban district in Madaba governorate during 2011; raising economic slogans on eradicating poverty and unemployment in remote governorates. Such demands were also raised during 2010-2011 by other unionized movement embodied by an interest group calling for more rights of the day-to-day persons contracted by the government; e.g.; laborers of the ministry of agriculture from different governorates in Jordan organize a national protest in front of the Prime Ministry demanding to fix their employment and increase their wages referring to that as part of jobs’ security the country has to provide. The banners raised during the protest included statements such as *"family members of officials earn high salaries 1500 JOD ... and family members of poor people: the day-to-day labors earn 150 JOD!"*, *"enough promises we need actions!"*, *"administrative corruption is worse than financial corruption!"*.

Initially, the slogans in Jordan evolved without approaching the royal system; calling for achieving comprehensive reform, enhance the living standards of citizens, fighting poverty and unemployment in remote governorates, fight the privatization process, and develop the economic and political approaches by the successive governments. Slogans included: *"we have legitimize demands...bread, dignity, and freedom"*, *"no to privatization... yes to public sector"*. Such slogans have also called for government and parliament to resolve, e.g. in 17th January 2011 a protest started from the front yard of the parliament demanded the government of the Prime Minister then Mr. Sameer Rifa'i to resign. The protest also demanded to appoint national rescue government lead by trusted public personality. The slogans sometimes were accompanied by calls for cancelling the Jordanian Israeli Peace process and shut the Israeli embassy in Amman.

On 23rd February 2011 new demands were raised, embodied by constitutional amendments representing a way out for the people and the king. In this regard, Mr. Erhail Gharaibah the president of the political office and member of the executive office of the Muslim brotherhood in Jordan stated that the king should respond to the constitutional monarchy.

Competing corruption revealed as the main slogan of many demonstrations especially on the governorates level such as: *"we will always fight against corrupted people"*, *"Jordan people are not needy, you damage us with corruption"*, and *"we want to compete corruption! We are bored of being needy"*. On the other hand, demonstrations in Amman; represented mainly by AIF focused on other issues beside anti-corruption. These are: the Syrian internal issue, the constitutional amendments and the election law.

Studying the evolution of the slogans; it can be concluded that in a later stage the slogans have moved from slogans for economic demands to slogans for enhancing freedoms of expressions and public participation in the decision making process, and preventing the security interventions on citizens civic and partisan engagement. Slogans included: *"Jordan is the country of free men... the security solution is not the choice"* *"we weren't born to lose our dignity...we were born free"* *"our demands are legitimate... We want freedom"*.

On 24th March 2011, around 2000 Jordanians have responded to a nonviolence movement organized by a group of young Jordanian from different areas in Jordan at Interior circle (Jamal Abd al Nassir Square) in Amman inspired by the Egyptian and Tunisian experiences. The movement demanded to apply the principle of "nation is the source of all powers", limiting the king's powers as the higher command of the armed forces and the head of the three Authorities (executive, legislative, and judicial), enacting an election law with consider to Jordanian population density, adapting a parliamentary government approach, elected upper house, establishment of the constitutional court, and the elimination of the inelegance's intervention in the public life; the participants yelled in straight words to solve the inelegances force and to dismiss the president of the intelligence force then, Mr. Mohammad Al-Raqad. Slogans of the movement included: *"With soul and blood we sacrifice Jordan"*, *"revolution will round and round, Jordan is the next"*. Though the March 24th movement did not

last for long, it is considered a milestone in the Jordanian spring, due to the violence it accompanied and the slogans it produced.

In another dimension, the teachers hold an open strike in 20th May 2011; demanding the government to respond to their demand of establishing a teachers' syndicate. This strike came as a response by the teachers to governments lack of tempt and real actions to establish the syndicate since their starts in March 2010.

Later to this period the slogans developed to mainly slogans calls for regime reform. Which was much used by the IAF protests. However, during February 2012 the slogans quickly developed to touch Queen Rania Al-Abdullah and her family; uncles and brother in specific. Slogans included "*we'll prosecute the corrupted...firstly Majdi Al-Yaseen¹*". Later, in in more sensitive level to touch the king himself, stating, "*listen... listen... regime... the Jordanians will not be humiliated*" and "*Jordanians want reform*". Moreover recently during March 2012 in response to detention for four activists from Tafila; number of protester from Tafila yelled in the front yard of the Jwida prison and in front of the royal court: "*release the four activists before reviving another April²*". The slogans also threaten the regime that if they didn't respond to their demands they will call for the falling of regime.

VII. GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO THE NONVIOLENT MOVEMENTS IN JORDAN

Generally, government response to nonviolence movements can be prescribed, as nonviolence responses. Jordan security force considered the less violent force among the region in regards to resolution and suppression of the civic movements' activities and protests.

However, in a few cases the security forces showed different attitudes. A few cases of violent behaviors by the security forces and attacking of protesters

¹ Majdi Al-Yaseen is the Queen's brother

² Referring here to "Habbet Neesan, which is the riots started in Ma'an on April 17, 1989, and expanded to neighboring cities

(civilians, journalists, etc.) were documented over the duration of 14 months of the movement. The level of violence showed strong link to the ceiling of slogans and demands, reaching its worst cases if related to king or royal family.

During the protesting of the Movement "24th March" at Jamal Abd al Nassir Square in Amman on 24th march 2011 the security forces showed violent and unjustified behavior, which was strongly criticized by local community and human rights organizations. This action resulted with damages of properties and injured protesters. The security forces also were criticized for allowing an opposition group to the protesters "loyalists group" to attack the protesters using sticks, rocks, and metal batons without legal prosecution. This behavior of supporting loyalists' violence against the members of nonviolence movements was also present at one protest at Salhob area in Jerash governorate, where a group of loyalists attacked the nonviolence gathering of activists in a clear absence of the security protection. This policy somehow contributed to produce organized threaten to the nonviolence movements, where some activists argue that these groups are funded by the security bodies.

Another violent behavior by the security forces targeting number of journalists was present at the Nakhel squire in front of Al-Hussain Mosque. The security forces have physically attacked the journalists, and destroyed their properties. The security force admit their involvement to these attacks and officially apologized from the protesters; defending their behavior as unstructured technique and a represent personal behavior by some of the security source members.

The government has utilized another tool to fight the nonviolence movements. This is: the formal media outlets (radio, newspapers, electronic news agencies), which was advocating against the nonviolence movements; describing the participants at these movements with the "Vandals".

VIII. REASONS BEHIND THE NONVIOLENT NATURE OF THE MOVEMENTS IN JORDAN

The researchers believe that number of reasons have encouraged and sustain nature of the nonviolence movements in Jordan, which can be summarized by:

Containment strategies by the government: which strongly encouraged the nonviolence movement. The government maintained a nonviolence response to the nonviolence movements except for a few cases linked directly to the ceiling of slogans and demands, reaching its worst cases if related to king or royal family. This policy proven the clever of the regime to maintain the nonviolence movements and sustain the internal security.

Strategies used by the movements to sustain its nonviolent nature: the strategies maintained by the nonviolent movements was built on avoiding collisions with opposing forces and refuse to meet violence with violence, resorting to the justice system and legal deliberations to contest violence against the movements, sustaining channels of communications with officials and security personnel.

The popular support to the Jordanian regime amongst the society, based on number of aspects, summarized by: the nonviolent history of the regime against the people, the regime consider the pillar of stability and security in the country and people's acceptance of the level of development achievements in comparison to GDP and natural resources. Thus, it can be argued that despite of the recent criticisms to the regime, he posses a strong popularity. However, this popularity can be referred to the people's loyalty to this regime or people need to this regime.

The tribal nature of the Jordanian society does not allow for excessive use of force by security apparatus: as most of the security apparatus members belong to tribes, and engaged with strong relationships with the protesters (Relatives, neighbors, cousins and friends).

IX. NONVIOLENCE STRATEGIES USED BY THE MOVEMENTS IN JORDAN

The nonviolence strategies used by the movements over a 14 months was developed gradually, inspired by Arab spring, specifically, the strategies utilized by the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions. The progress of the strategies was also linked to the increasing of the slogans and demands. The strategies used many tools, such as social media, statements and sit-ins, and open strike. Moreover. The nonviolence movements insured to use three main strategies to maintain the sustainability of the nonviolence atmosphere. Those are:

1. Avoiding collisions with opposing forces and refuse to meet violence with violence, this was witnessed through the selection of locations and time of the movements activities, the cancellation of some activities if suspecting any violence activities by oppositions to the movements'. The nonviolence movements also refuse to meet the violence of both physical attacks or damaging of property with same violence to the offenders. However, a few individual cases was observed in the southern governorates, where the movements members wanted to prove their ability to defense themselves against violence, even if meant using same violence.

2. Resorting to the justice system and legal deliberations to contest violence against the movements, where members of the nonviolence movements faced physical violence or destroying of their properties have press charges for compensation for damage. One of the famous charges in this regard was raised by one of the political office members of Jordanian Democratic Popular Unity Party where he press charges in front of the court demanding for compensation for damages resulted from physically attacking him and his car while participating in one of the demonstration.

3. Sustaining channels of communications with officials and security personnel: the movements often, sustain open channels with the security personnel to maintain the nonviolence movements in Jordan. These channels were affected by the response of the security apparatus to the movements' activities. Thus, differs from time to time. However, the movements witnessed many calls to eliminate the security interventions on citizens civic and partisan

engagement. On the other hand, recent detentions of activists by the security apparatus have harmed this relationship and is hindering its sustainability.

X. CHALLENGES FACED BY THE NONVIOLENT MOVEMENTS IN JORDAN

The nonviolence movements in Jordan face number of challenges. These challenges can be divided into three levels, the internal challenges (weaknesses), the external challenges (threats), and the demographic challenge to the nonviolent movements in Jordan.

Internal challenges (weaknesses)

1. Organizational coordination between the different movements: this challenge considers one of the main challenges facing the sustainability of nonviolence movements in Jordan. Despite the calling for common demands; movements in Jordan has shown obvious Internal divisions and factional trends, which in turn, have weaken the organizational structure of the movements and weaken the public sympathy to the movements. On the other hand, lack of organizational coordination may results to individuals mistaken leading to violence movements.

2. Weakness in prioritizing and providing alternatives to the status quo: the nonviolence movements in Jordan played an essential role in moving the wheel of reform, and forcing the regime to attain critical steps toward anti-corruption, economic reform, and constitutional amendments. However, those demands were not modeled in a well-organized structure, which leave a general impression of how scattered these demands are, and decrease the opportunities for these demands to be achieved. The movements in Jordan lack of providing a well-organized, measurable, and reasonable initiative for reform, e.g. the movements requested to amend the election law. However, did not provide a draft for the law or common issues to be addressed.

3. Competition among political parties within the movements: political parties comprise a strong component at the nonviolence movements in Jordan. Which in turn, create a huge conflict on different levels especially between the two main ideological parties: Islamic Action Front party and the communist

parties. At some level these conflicts were overcoming the common demands; resulting to Lacking of public sympathy to the movements, and decrease the opportunities for movements' demands to be achieved. It's worth mentioning that parties in Jordan lack of public interest and support due the weak role they perform among other factors.

Trust issues among members of the movements:

4. Lack of qualified leaderships: the nonviolence movements in Jordan have lack of qualified leaderships in terms of sustaining constrictive demands, and in terms of the ability to communicate with different factions of the Jordanian community, media outlets and government's officials. This was revealed through the individual actions by some of the movements' members through insulting of revolution characters, and enhancing internal divisions and factional trends. These actions have harmed the public sympathy and the nonviolence of movements.

5. Trust issues among members of the movements: studying the current situation, it's obvious that a real lack of trust exists among the movements' members. This lack of trust was enhanced by different factors and interventions. And have contributed to drag the movements' attention from their reform demands to internal conflicts. The lack of trust was feed by opinions warning from the role IAF may play and the power they could approach through these movements, while others warn the partisan control over the movements' achievements. On the other hand, for some opinion the movements are an approach to facilitate for the "substitute homeland".

External challenges (threats)

1. Media campaigns against the movements: forma media played an essential role on advocating against the nonviolence movements. This advocacy has impact the public opinion on how they perceive the movements' demands. Media advocacy focused on the foreign agenda of the movements, and accusing some of the movements' members and harm their social images.

The oppressive government reaction to some of the movements' activities: generally, government's response to nonviolence movements was nonviolent. However, in a few cases the security forces showed different attitudes through attacking of protesters (civilians, journalists, etc.), detention of protesters, and reducing the freedoms of expression and nonviolent movements. This has negatively affected the nonviolence movements, and produce in some cases violent behaviors by protesters.

2. The societal culture: between longing for reform and fear of neighboring experiences: looking at the neighbors experiences and the size of sacrifices provided; the Jordanian community is divided into two factions: the first, supporting the movements in any price. The second believe in the importance of reform and anti-corruption. However, they are not ready to give any price in the sake of this. Thus, they encourage their families, especially youth for avoiding such movements.

3. The impact of regional events on internal dynamics of the movements: the regional events, such as the Syrian revolution, have strongly impacted the internal dynamics of the movements; contributing to increasing level of divisions and conflicts between the members of movements, which in turn, impact the nonviolent of theses movements. The expression of these conflicts was obvious through the raising of some slogans directly relevant to the events during the protest and movements' activities.

4. The extensive support to the regime from international actors (Saudi Arabia, USA, UK, etc...): the regime enjoys a high level of support by these actors. Thus, the regime seems to be under extensive public pressure due to the huge media campaign advocating for the movements and their demands. However, the regime is highly confident and is executing its strategies and policies calmly.

The demographic challenge to the nonviolent movements in Jordan

In 1948 the Arab Israeli conflict began. This conflict has resulted in the migration of thousands of Palestinians from their homeland to settle in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. The Palestinians coming to Jordan were provided with the Jordanian

19

nationality. Thus the Jordanian community became a mixture of east bankers and west bankers. As much as this migration has contributed to the progress of the country (as the migrations of the minorities of Syrians, Chechens, Circassians, and Druze). This has also created a conflict on the identity and a question of who a the Jordanian citizen?

The relationships between the Jordanians from Palestinian origins and Jordanian origins has gone through different situation, while this relationship has reached its maximum harmony at the beginning of migration due to sympathy and support to Palestinians who were forced to leave their homes and lost their lands. To its minimum harmony, even an armed conflict during the internal war during 1970 or what was called "Black September".

Followed by years of sidelining west bankers in the political life, combined with their own lack of interest in politics and focus on economic activities, have all gathered to present a demographic challenge to the nonviolent movements in Jordan. Jordanians of Palestinian origins are skeptical of participating in the movements as they are more comfortable with the status quo rather than an unpredictable future.

The lack of participation by Jordanians of Palestinian origins has weakened the momentum of the movements, as it results in lack of interest of a portion close to 50% of the population.

XI. THE ROLE OF WOMEN, MEDIA, CIVIL SOCIETY, POLITICAL PARTIES AND MINORITIES IN THE NONVIOLENT MOVEMENTS IN JORDAN

Women: Media archives show a weak participation by women in the events of the movements. Those activities that took place in the center part of the country were attended by women largely affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, while other parts of the country did not witness such participation due to cultural norms.

Media: media as in any other country play an essential role to advocate for or against the nonviolent movements in Jordan. State owned media (such as the

radio station of the security apparatus) took a stand against the movements and portrayed them as mischievous. Media sympathizing with the movements have worked to counter the state owned media propaganda; advocating for the movements demands and criticizing the violent actions by the security apparatus against these movements. It also played a significant role in publishing the corruptions revealed in some of the government's files and programs. Unfortunately, both sides were biased, which created a sense of critique among the people. However, this sense is still under progress. The social network has also played an essential role in the advocacy campaigns; considering that 35% of Jordanians are using the Facebook. This has encouraged the state to also use these networks to advocate for their image and reform plan. Though the initiative was late and unsuccessful.

Civil Society: from the start of the movements, civil society organization have tried to bridge the gap between the government and the people, however, it failed due to the following reasons: the civil society organizations reflect the dual polarity with regard to reforming the regime in Jordan, many of the organizations developed biased stands based on their funding relation and the political positions of their management, the existence of trust issues between the movements and civil society organizations based on the foreign funding of the latter and the agenda governing such funding, the clear opposition of the leftist and pan-nationalist forces to civil society organizations receiving foreign funding, and negative sentiment created between political parties and civil society organizations due to the double standard applied by the government in terms of space allowed especially at universities.

Political Parties: as for the political parties, the Muslim Brotherhood, through the Islamic Action Front (IAF), has been the most active and polarized; though its demands and activities remained constant as such it was before the Arab Spring. Other parties have also been involved the movements, whether in coordination with the IAF or with tribes, the most active of which were the pan-nationalists such as the Socialist Arab Bath Party, the Communist Party and the Popular Unity Party. Many activists in the nonviolent movement regard political parties to be inefficient and one step behind in addressing people's needs and demands and in taking the streets. Noting that the Jordanian government would only engage the

IAF in political discussions, allowing grounds for both to be criticized by other political parties and tribal forces.

Minorities: the Jordan Community is a mixture of different population backgrounds including ethnic and religious minorities. As in other countries minorities in Jordan are located in specific geographical areas. However, these minorities are open to public participations and sustain good relationships with the other factions of the Jordanian community. With regards to their participation in the nonviolent movements; ethnic minorities has shown weak participation, e.g; the Circassians movement that issued statements largely accepted by the public. On the other hand, there has not been any organization of people under a religious minorities umbrella, though several members of religious minorities are involved in the movement. It's worth noting that the Jordanian regime had always taken care of minorities and provided the space for them to grow content.

XII. THE IMPACT OF THE MOVEMENTS ON DEMOCRATIZATION AND GOOD GOVERNANCE

The nonviolent movements in Jordan were not initiated to engage political reform. They started by demanding geographical and tribal socio-economic needs that later on evolved into political demands. The movements created pressure on the Jordanian governments (3 government in 14 months) and parliament to institute so political reform initiatives, such as: forty-two constitutional amendments; most relevant of which are the independent commission for election observation, the constitutional court, forcing the government to resign within one week of dissolution of parliament and limiting its ability to issue temporary laws, and requiring the regime to hold elections within four months after the dismissal of parliament. It have also pressure the government to amend the public gathering law, where political parties and civil society organizations have bigger space to operate, to establish a syndicate for teachers, and to enhance transparency and combat corruptions.

XIII. THE FUTURE OF THE NONVIOLENT MOVEMENTS AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM IN JORDAN

It is most likely that the government will not meet the demands of the Muslim Brotherhood or the other movements protesting nonviolently, which will drive the country to a crossroad of unknown endings. This is as the government's policy has been to eliminate the movements thus far, instead of utilizing it to create frameworks and effect social and political change. As per observation and remarks of many of those interviewed for this research, the divisions and disparities among the movements in Jordan have provided the regime the opportunity to check the level of reforms to be instituted. The constitutional amendments and suggested reformed political legislations are seen by many to surpass the demands of the movements.

The movements are expected to continue throughout the year with their current momentum, if not lesser. Where it will end with the conclusion of early parliamentary elections, to be held before the end of 2012, as promised by the regime, to be held under the supervision and administration by an independent elections commission and according to a new elections and political parties laws.

However, the momentum of the movements will increase and its intensity will escalate, if the the elections were rigged again.

The future of the movements in Jordan is also dependent on regional events. A military action in Syria would result in announcing martial laws in Jordan, as Jordan is expected to take a big role in such an action, thus putting an end to the movements and their demands. Though it might provide the regime and the people a chance to open a new page and start a comprehensive reform process at the conclusion of the martial laws.

Similar to the results of the uprisings in other countries in the region, in the case of passing reforms that would allow for free elections, young people leading and taking part in the movements are expected to be sidelined by the political parties in the country, especially the Islamic Action Front, which is also likely to marginalize other political parties, and assume charge of the countries political system on its own.

XIV. SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNT

Several lessons can be drawn from observing the nonviolent movements in Jordan and their surrounding events:

- There is a need to enhance the role of civil society organizations in social mobilization and citizenship education, as they have underachieved in this area; this is important due to the weakness and inefficiency of the political parties in the country.
- The strategies used by the nonviolent movements to maintain the peacefulness of their activities have been very effective.
- Lack of a specific platform and division among the movements represent the biggest challenge faced by the movements in their pursuit of reform.
- The soft containment strategy used by the government has contributed to the nonviolent nature of the movements.
- Political parties need to revisit their strategies in order to gather more popular support, as it has inefficiently participated in the nonviolent movement.
- Social media is an important pillar of advocacy and mobilization for nonviolent movements.
- Regimes and governments should respond to the demands of their peoples before these demands reach a level that cannot be met.
- The intensity of media coverage of the nonviolent movements doesn't necessarily reflect the level of its popular support.
- The continued dialogue and support to the Jordanian regime by western governments has strongly contributed to its preservation and its peaceful attitude to the movements.
- The peaceful history of the Jordanian regime in dealing with activists and opposition over the past decades has largely contributed to the

nonviolence of the movements and their relatively milder demands in comparison to neighboring countries.

- It is now evident that more institutionalized policies are needed for better political management of the country's affairs.
- Religious groups, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, allow the movements large momentum, however, it might undermine people's dream of a civic state.
- The factors that contributed to the start of the movements calling for reform, especially corruption and poverty, need to be addressed to avoid the movements turn into violent.
- Of the main reasons contributing to the nonviolent nature of the movements is the impartiality of the government controlled media and security forces and maintain a similar distance from all political actors.
- Allowing more freedom of expression would result in avoiding collisions and conflicts, as well as allow an environment opposing to radical discourse.
- Combating corruption, economic deterioration and nontransparent privatization have been the main demands of the Jordanian nonviolent movements; therefore, the government should avoid such controversies to escape possible future revolts.
- The rigging of the parliamentary and municipal elections has been an instrumental catalyst for the movements.
- There is a need to spread a culture of accepting the other among the activists and security personnel.
- Movements should keep a minimum dialogue with the government to sustain its nonviolent nature and receive recognition to achieve their demands.
- The government has to admit its intention to allow more space for political freedoms, even if that entailed admitting to previously violating these freedoms, as witnessed by political movements in the universities.

- Tribal ties of the movements should be replaced with ties and affiliation to political parties, where, even though, tribes have allowed wider popular support to the nonviolent movements, they might cause the movements to become violent.
- The responsibility to enhance the awareness of the people and spread the culture of tolerance and acceptance of others lies on educational institutions and civil society organization, as they possess the space and abilities to do so.
- Objective responsible media should be protected from interference, to ensure a moderate public opinion and the nonviolent nature of the movements.
- The nonviolent movements should avoid slandering and verbal violence to secure more popular support.
- The government should become more serious in enforcing the rule of law and less selective in persecuting corruption cases to ensure the sustainability of the nonviolent nature of the movements.
- The government needs to put an end to arresting and threatening activists to sustain the nonviolent nature of the movements.
- All stakeholders should accept the outcomes of the democratization process and respect the decisions of the majority.
- The failure of nonviolent movements in achieving their demands during the Arab Spring in other countries has contributed to the lack of popular support to these movements in Jordan.
- Considering the experiences of Egypt and Tunisia, such informal movements will need to organize and consolidate itself in a more efficient manner in order to take a more active role in the period following the reforms; otherwise the sole “winner” will be the organized political forces.